Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example. We also assess with high confidence that since fall , Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons. As of , the United States also continued to believe that Iran was not currently engaged in the most important activities associated with building a nuclear bomb.
This has made its activities of high interest to the international community and the IAEA. From to , five Iranian scientists with connections to the nuclear program were assassinated. At least two of those individuals—Majid Shariari and Masoud Alimohammadi—were key individuals in the former weapons program and were involved in plans to continue with some research activities after the halt. Ferydoun Abbasi-Davani, who was the target of a failed assassination attempt and who would eventually go on to become the head of the AEOI, was also involved in those weaponization research efforts.
These assassinations, continued IAEA investigations , and the theft of the archives have surely resulted in significant pressure , embarrassment , as well as perhaps even the loss of morale and expertise. For example, nonproliferation experts have noted that Fakhrizadeh was not irreplaceable and had likely passed on his knowledge to the next generation of Iranian scientists.
This is not to say that building a bomb would be impossible for Iran or that new hurdles would be insurmountable, only that it would take longer and be harder than it might have been years ago.
How could this have happened? True, others within the military research establishment may have similar expertise as those assassinated, and Iran could certainly develop new plans and repeat old experiments.
But doing so may take longer than if Iran had those scientists and information at the ready. If, for example, Fakhrizadeh was merely a figurehead with little responsibility or sway, then his assassination may mean little. But if, as some accounts suggest , he was the glue that held the former nuclear weapons cadre together and was a source of nuclear weapons advocacy within the regime, then his assassination could have a far greater impact.
In addition to the potential for reduced capacity for weaponization work, many of these factors above also raise the question of whether it would be wise for Iran to use this group for a resumed weapons project.
The theft of the archives, continued IAEA investigations, and assassinations make it abundantly clear that this group and their work have been penetrated by foreign intelligence organizations and are under an international microscope. The IAEA has, if anything, become more vocal about its concerns over the past few years and continues to insist that Iran provide answers. This raises major questions about whether Iran could keep a nuclear weapons program run by SPND a secret and whether Iranian leaders would actually turn to SPND for a renewed weapons program.
If Iran concludes the risks of turning to SPND are too high, but yet it still perceives a need to begin a covert weapons program, where else might Iran turn to for bomb-making assistance? Although using these IAEA-monitored capabilities to actually dash toward the bomb would be highly risky, the skills and expertise could be applied to covert projects. There is no credible evidence that Iran has ever received assistance from North Korea on nuclear weapons, but reports of resumed missile cooperation highlight that this is a connection that must continue to be monitored.
Also, Iran may drag its feet on the path to a bomb. Iranian leaders have seen Japan as a model and have argued that if Japan is allowed to have fuel-cycle technologies and stay in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, then Iran should have that option too. This slow proliferation can only partly be explained by threats of strict nonproliferation sanctions. Even without them, prolonging nuclear latency may make sense for most potential nuclear powers, politically, economically, and strategically.
Politically, nuclear weapons have not proven to be a broadly useful coercive tool, as it is difficult to credibly threaten the use of such destructive power unless in response to severe security threats. By contrast, stopping short of building nuclear bombs while keeping or upgrading the relevant technologies can buy a state bargaining leverage often disproportionate to its capabilities.
This is apparently the reason Iran is currently engaging in nuclear activities that have no civil justification. By threatening to go nuclear, even a minor state that otherwise would be ignored on the world stage can pressure proliferation-averse major powers to offer rewards for staying nuclear-free.
President Barack Obama commented that the "configuration" of the Fordow facility is "not consistent with a peaceful nuclear program. Meanwhile, Iranian clerical, civilian, and military leaders have repeatedly expressed their intention to wipe Israel off of the map. The United Nations Security Council also enacted sanctions against Iran for its nuclear proliferation activity. This step could considerably decrease the breakout time that it would take for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. On July 7 Iran also declared it was enriching uranium beyond 3.
In response, the Britain, France and Germany triggered the dispute-settlement mechanism part of the agreement, which could result in the UN Security Council re-imposing some of the sanctions that had been lifted as part of the deal.
Since the revolution which overthrew the monarchy, Iran has been run by a Shia Islamist regime which has violently suppressed internal dissent. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's powerful Supreme Leader, is the ultimate authority in the Islamic Republic, and it is he who makes the major policy decisions.
There have been periods when it appeared that the Iranian leadership was opting for some relative moderation and reform. This occurred with the election of Mohamed Khatami, considered the "reformist candidate" to the presidency in While the Khatami government through was marked by some moderation in Iran's public stance towards the West, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, tightly controlled most of the state apparatus.
Because Iran has signed the NPT, it is committed to using nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes. Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said on 20 January that the country is prepared to withdraw if its continued enrichment programme is reported to the UN Security Council. Albright agrees, saying that Iran could be stockpiling enriched uranium to increase its leverage in future negotiations. But stepping away from its JCPOA obligations — and in particular, increasing stockpiles of enriched uranium — brings the country closer to having the capability to do so.
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