It would be five or six more hours before he learned that his daughter-in-law and grandchild were dead. In the fall of , the mayor of a remote Central African village biked 70 miles over two days to reach the town of Sam Ouandja to request that Invisible Children install a radio in his community.
Some villages also earn money by charging roving traders a few Congolese francs to make calls. Isolated communities in Congo and the Central African Republic are desperate for more radios, which are often the only lifelines to the outside world. Villages use them to exchange news about commodity prices, request medical help, and keep in touch with family.
While he grumbled about the lack of pay from Invisible Children, Ambroise likes that the job broadens his horizons. Whatever their complaints, volunteer operators — and, indeed, many Congolese in this neglected region — are grateful to Invisible Children for providing connectivity in a corner of the country almost devoid of social services. But I sensed that operators were only partially aware of the risk they were running by becoming veritable intelligence operatives.
Invisible Children clothes its operators in T-shirts with a logo — a handset surrounded by emanating radio waves — emblazoned on the chest. On my last full day in Dungu, I drove with two operators to check on a malfunctioning radio in Duru, a town some 50 miles away, near the South Sudanese border.
On the way back, we stopped in a flyspeck village with a high-frequency radio operated by Catholic Relief Services. A Congolese army officer was inside using the radio, which would be against Invisible Children protocol. I asked the operator if the army listens to his daily calls. Absolutely not, he replied. They do not have our frequency. A few kilometers down the road, I stopped at several Congolese army checkpoints, which are usually just two or three soldiers living in thatched huts and farming small plots to feed themselves.
The checkpoints appear every few miles or so marked by dummies dressed in helmet and fatigues, both to alert drivers and sometimes draw LRA fire as soldiers beat a retreat. At the second checkpoint, I introduced myself, handed out cigarettes to lighten the mood, and asked the Congolese soldiers if they ever listened in to the CRS radio network. He puffed on his cigarette and then recited the two daily call times. Kony himself may be dialing into the twice-daily rondes for all Invisible Children knows: He uses high-frequency radios to direct his scattered fighters from the safety of Sudan, where he is believed to have taken refuge some miles away.
There is no way to know who is on the line. American and Ugandan troops responded within a few hours; when they left, the rebels running the village beat the operator, believing that he was collaborating with the LRA he was not and the U. Gunmen asked if anyone had a phone, and residents immediately led them to the home of an Invisible Children operator with a Thuraya satellite phone, which the group distributes in some areas of the Central African Republic where installing a high-frequency radio is too difficult — or where it might attract the wrong attention.
LRA gunmen stole the phone and held the operator captive for a week. Sean Poole said he had no record of such an attack, although he did point to a December attack on Kpabou that was reported by satellite phone in which the LRA abducted 10 civilians and stole a high-frequency radio battery for its own use. I first asked Zerla about her relationship with the U. A week later, I pressed her again on this point.
I asked if she was comfortable being in the dark about how military commanders used the intelligence she provided. I continued to ask probing questions, and she became so agitated that she stood up from the table, walked over, and loomed above me. But the foundation no longer provides air support and military training to the UPDF, and since , Bridgeway has considered its counter-LRA work mostly finished.
Invisible Children wants to stay in the region for as long as possible. The group's data, gathered over the radio network, shows an uptick in violence: The LRA abducted people and killed 21 last year, up from and 11, respectively, in It is already one of the last NGOs in Dungu. The radios will remain, an emergency hotline to which anyone can listen and no one will respond.
Last summer, the Ugandan military announced that it would draw down its counter-LRA deployment. Kayanja Muhanga, who was preparing to redeploy to Mogadishu, told me that the number of Kony's fighters was dwindling, and other hotspots more central to Uganda's national interests — like Somalia and South Sudan — now required greater attention, which is why the UPDF considers its mission in central Africa more or less complete.
Underestimating the LRA would prove a costly error. After an early and abortive attempt at peace, Kony secured the backing of the Sudanese government, which was battling Ugandan-backed rebels in its southern regions and happy to train and equip his army of abducted child soldiers — so long as they carried out the occasional attack against the southern Sudanese rebels. The Ugandans launched operation after operation against the LRA, but were thwarted by poor equipment and lack of contingency planning.
Operation Iron Fist , launched in , for example, pushed the LRA from southern Sudan back into northern Uganda, where they wreaked havoc on the civilian population. After yet another failed attempt at negotiating peace, the Bush administration began aiding the Ugandan military effort.
In December , it provided intelligence for a massive air and ground assault on LRA bases in Garamba. But poor coordination and planning once again hampered the Ugandan Army, with Kony and most of his or so fighters escaping unharmed. In retaliation for the strike, Kony ordered the killings of close to 1, Congolese civilians, whom he faulted for allowing the Ugandan Army inside Congo.
There, Kony established a new base of operations, sending small groups of fighters to poach elephants in Garamba so that their tusks could be exchanged for food and ammunition. When American soldiers entered the fray in late , the LRA numbered just people, including women and children, divided into at least seven groups operating in three countries. All of the groups had settled into survival patterns that included poaching and raiding villages.
None were carrying out offensive operations against military targets. The Americans provided vital air assets that carried food, materiel, and troops from Uganda to South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Their spy planes also collected intelligence that was funneled to Ugandan soldiers on the ground.
Despite promising her followers protection from bullets, Ms Auma's movement was defeated in and she fled to Kenya. The LRA was founded in the aftermath of that defeat saying it continued to support the people of the north and wanted to install a government based on the biblical 10 commandments. At one time the LRA was popular in the north, but that waned as the group's brutality increased. Mr Kony has used religion and traditional beliefs to inspire his followers but some question his sincere commitment to those ideas.
They say, 'You, Mr Joseph, tell your people that the enemy is planning to come and attack,'" he has explained. In a film broadcast on the BBC, one of his close allies, Captain Sunday, said that through the help of spirits the LRA leader could see the future.
He was also immortal, the captain added. He has created an aura of mysticism around himself and his rebels follow strict rules and rituals. They say that the oil is the power of the Holy Spirit. He has also used terror to maintain control, beating and killing followers who were caught trying to flee.
Some former fighters have said they complied with the leader's orders out of fear. Ex-commander Kenneth Banya told the BBC in that he had sex with a minor because he was threatened with death if he left her alone.
Mr Kony has described himself as a "freedom fighter" but has been accused of being responsible for the deaths of thousands of people in the north of Uganda. He has used biblical references to explain why it was necessary to kill his own people, since they had, in his view, failed to support his cause. In his first interview in , filmed at his jungle base at the time in DR Congo , he insisted he was not the monster he was portrayed to be.
I cannot cut the ear of my brother; I cannot kill the eye of my brother. Mr Kony's fighters continued to spread terror targeting and killing local people for provisions. The group was forced out of northern Uganda in , but the campaign forced Kony to move his forces deeper into the border region between South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While Kony was not caught, the effort diminished the size of the group.
What remains is a fractured rebel group with fewer than fighters and a weak leadership structure. Tracking the LRA. A resurgent LRA is a low concern to him. Reports from former combatants and the activities by the LRA point to a Kony who is increasingly paranoid. Most of the current LRA force is made up of non-Ugandans, but Kony is unwilling to promote any of them to top ranks in the rebel group. The attrition of Ugandan commanders because of defections and executions leaves a weak command structure with an unstable leader.
The greatest external pressure on the LRA now comes from regional rebel groups, poachers and armed cattle-herders. If anyone is going to kill Kony, it is likely to be one of those groups, Ronan said. However, he worries that the desperation of the LRA may force it to overcome some of its problems and lead to a new period of growth.
There are U. Also concerning is the potential for other rebel groups to gain strength with the military withdrawal.
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